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ABSTRACT  
 
Across Europe, culture is acquiring an increasing constitutional relevance by fostering experiments 
of bottom-up reflexive and self-organised participation able to bring policymakers closer to citizens.  
This paper adopts a European Union (EU) standpoint, observing how the EU could use cultural 
programs to support these practices and promote democracy and inclusion in the wake of the ‘crisis 
of political representation’. The objective is to draw recommendations for EU institutions to connect 
with local communities by multiplying the opportunities of equality and inclusion without interfer-
ing with local democracy. 
The investigation starts from an analysis – also through the case study of Italian constitutional 
transformations – of how the ‘distrust’ towards representation transformed the constitutional set-
tlements of democratic participation. The study emphasises the need for new participatory forms 
and the relevance of spontaneous bottom-up initiatives in that direction, especially in the cultural 
field. Against this backdrop, the article will explore how EU cultural policies could be more 
inclusive so as to improve their social approach and trigger a direct dialogue with grassroots expe-
riences. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper adopts a European Union (EU) standpoint, observing how – in 
the current constitutional transformations due to the so-called ‘crisis of political rep-
resentation’ – the EU could use its cultural programs to promote democracy and 
inclusion by supporting culture and namely cultural and creative spaces.  
Culture and cultural spaces are central in this essay because they have 
demonstrated to be a booster of bottom-up reflexive and self-organised initiatives 
that are key in the effort to improve EU democracy and narrow the gap between 
policymakers and citizens. Of course, cultural programs are not the only leverage that 
can be used to favour bottom-up participation and inclusion at EU level. However, 
this text is focused on that specific sector because its importance appears to be un-
derestimated in both national (see para. 2.2) and EU budget choices (see para. 4.1). 
The article brings to light culture as the base of important experiments of grassroots 
participation. Therefore, it makes the case for an acknowledgement and support of 
its role by the EU.  
Then, recommendations will be formulated for EU institutions to support 
such practices by fostering equality and inclusion without interfering with local de-
mocracy.  
The analysis holds a constitutional law approach, addressing pressing ques-
tions and challenges related to the theory and practice of representation. In this 
framework, culture acquires a constitutional relevance as a fundamental right itself 
and as an essential driver of grassroots practices that are rethinking democratic mech-
anisms and proposing new participatory institutions through self-organisation. At the 
same time, constitutional law represents an essential contribution to cultural policies, 
able to connect them with participatory rights and improve the role of local commu-
nities in decision-making. 
After the example of what was made by Practice Theory in the field of the 
International Relations (see Neumann 2002, 629; Adler and Pouliot 2011, 14 ss.; Cor-
nut 2017, 4 ss.), this article will give relevance to the strengthening of relatively small 
participatory practices. These ‘micro-policies’ can have a deep impact in 
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constitutional systems, by elaborating new forms of political self-organisation and 
self-determination by means of concrete experimentations, trials and errors, and even 
successes and pitfalls of utopian aspirations (Latour 1983, 164–165).  
This fact-based approach is deemed even more appropriate for this study 
because culture and participation are social rights1, related to substantial equality. This 
assumption explains the need to focus not only on abstract rules, but also on their 
aptness to remove concrete barriers to economic, social, and political inclusion.  
Two methodological consequences can be drawn from this choice.  
Firstly, the intrinsic multilevel approach. Micro-practices of participation ad-
dress crucial issues of democracy at all levels because they are the final point of impact 
of different measures and initiatives adopted by various authorities. Therefore, start-
ing from practices also imposes a reflection about how these different levels can in-
teract with each other in order to maximise the response to fundamental needs of 
society.  
Secondly, the focus on practices imposes an interdisciplinary take. While 
being rooted in the field of constitutional law, the study holds a constant dialogue 
with policy studies in order to give specific attention the factual implementation of 
rules and their impact at micro-level.  
In particular, this factual investigation is based upon the findings of the on-
going EU policy project Cultural and Creative Spaces and Cities2 (CCSC). The project 
involved seven Urban Labs – i.e. different local experimentations of policy co-crea-
tion across Europe (Arreaga, Frías Hernández & Rodríguez 2020, 235–127) – studied 
by means of interviews, focus groups, co-creative events and field work, conducted 
in collaboration with practitioners and policy officers. Data were analysed and made 
comparable through qualitative indicators, based on shared values composing a Char-
ter of principles of the project consortium3, including the local coordinators of the 
 
1 A deeper argumentation of this assumption will be presented in the subsequent part of the text. 
2 www.spacesandcities.com. Further information on the methodology can be found in Torre 2020, 
12-31.  
3 https://www.spacesandcities.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/CCSC-Charter-of-Princi-
ples.pdf. 
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Urban Labs themselves. Namely, these values pivoted around topics that are central 
in this research: ‘Culture as a common good’, ‘Urban commons’, ‘Bottom-up pro-
cesses’ and ‘A new basis for the legitimisation of the EU’. The analysis was further 
developed through two co-creation events, involving researchers, multilevel policy-
makers and cultural actors, exploring issues related to the EU impact on local policy-
making. 
This research will be articulated in three parts. 
In the first part, the article will discuss the crisis of representation, as well as 
the reasons for its persisting indispensability. The research will elaborate on why 
spontaneous bottom-up initiatives deserve a special relevance in constitutional stud-
ies concerning the renewal of democratic forms. At the same time, it will outline 
possible risks and open questions of participatory processes.  
In the second part, the theoretical issues examined in the first part will be 
analysed through a case study: the institutional reforms in the Italian legal context. It-
aly is chosen as a testing ground for at least two reasons. Firstly, this Country was 
among the most affected by the economic crisis in 2008 with harsh effects on inclu-
sion and cohesion. The fallout of these events has been challenging equal political 
participation and, in turn, trust in representative democratic mechanisms. Secondly, 
and consequently, it is also symbolic in terms of constitutional transformations 
brought by the crisis of representation: at the time of writing, a referendum vote has 
just approved a reform that downsized the consistency of Italian Parliament. By now, 
it has the lowest ratio in the EU between numbers of Members of Parliament and 
inhabitants4.  
The case study exemplifies that objecting the traditional forms of represen-
tation does not automatically lead to more democratic institutions; oppositely, they 
can have distortive outcomes if inequalities are left unaddressed. Moreover, the ex-
ample also sheds light on how new forms of participatory democracy can stem from 
 
4 Camera dei Deputati – Servizio Studi & Senato della Repubblica – Servizio studi, Riduzione del nu-
mero dei parlamentari. Il testo di legge costituzionale e il referendum ex art. 138 della Costituzione, 
August 19th, 2020, 48. 
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spontaneous civic initiatives, especially in the cultural field. In this context, the impact 
of the economic crisis itself highlights the role of the EU intervention, with its con-
tradictions and opportunities.  
Finally, the third part – building on the theory and the evidence of the Italian 
case – aims to investigate how the EU can support initiatives of spontaneous partic-
ipation in the cultural field, by drawing potential recommendations on possible regu-
latory solutions. 
 
2. The Crisis of Representation as a Battleground for Constitutional Transfor-
mations 
 
2.1. Crisis of Representation as a Crisis of Social Inclusion 
Representation is a mechanism – somehow a ‘fictional’ mechanism (Kelsen 
1924, 160) – allowing the presence of those who are absent in a decision-making 
process (Pitkin 1972, 8–9; Denquin 2013, 6). Therefore, it has an intrinsically ‘aristo-
cratic’ aspect (Manin 1996, 189–190), since it legitimises representatives to exert de-
cision-making powers with erga omnes effects (Leibholz 1973, 70 and following). How-
ever, in democratic regimes this aspect is supposed to be compensated by a ‘repre-
sentative relationship’, through which representatives are held politically accountable 
– through the electoral renovation of representative charges – for their actions to-
wards the constituency.  
In a social State, the aim of representation is not only a practical one – the 
impossibility of gathering the whole constituency simultaneously – but also, and es-
pecially, a systemic one: to avoid an unmediated confrontation between unequal par-
ticular interests, which could lead to a predominance of those who are endowed with 
greater economic, cognitive, social or organisational capital (Innerarity 2015, 294).  
Indeed, participation is a costly activity, requiring time and capitals that are 
hardly affordable for some people. This settlement is an intrinsic recognition that 
participation is a social right: a right that can only be enforced with a material inter-
vention of the public authority. Another side of this acknowledgement is that 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 7(1) 2021:157-197, DOI: 10.1285/i20398573v7n1p157 
162 
 
democracy imposes a duty to institutions, which is to overcome economic inequalities 
and provide everyone with the means for a social, economic and political inclusion.  
Representative regimes respond to this task by regulating institutional or-
ganisation and decision-making in order to aggregate and represent the interests of 
these categories through parties and parliamentary groups, thus levelling the different 
stakeholders’ weight in public decision-making.  
This theoretical justification of political representation is widely accepted in 
theory, but still one of the most controversial issues in practices. Indeed, the legal 
affirmation of universal suffrage did not tackle the inequalities that needed to be ad-
dressed for everyone to be able to concretely participate in the economic, political 
and social life of the State. This failure is a substantial part of the ‘crisis of represen-
tation’ that is currently affecting EU countries.  
Across Europe, the widespread ‘distrust’ (Rosanvallon 2006) of representa-
tive democracy was the outcome of a crisis of traditional parties and ideologies but is 
also connected to the above problems of representation. Namely, the global eco-
nomic crisis exacerbated the unsolved contradictions of the social transformation of 
constitutions, by provoking the marginalisation of an increasing number of people.  
Here the problem is observed in the context of the EU which is also facing 
growing perplexities concerning its so-called ‘democratic deficit’. The alleged lack of 
legitimacy and responsiveness of EU institutions is a major concern for EU constit-
uencies. EU bodies are perceived as less accountable, since not all of them are directly 
elected and their decision-making is hardly accessible due to its procedural complexity 
and supranational nature. Moreover, in the aftermath of the economic crisis, a sense 
of delusion accompanied the acknowledgement – especially in the most precarious 
categories – that the EU was renouncing to mitigate the hardest social backlashes. 
To be sure, EU institutions have a weaker representative legitimisation than 
national institutions: while the European Parliament is directly elected by constitu-
ents, the Council, the European Council and the Commission only enjoy an indirect 
legitimisation. However, the argument of the ‘democratic deficit’ is also a controver-
sial one, since many authors insist on the existence of democratic guarantees in the 
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EU system (Moravcsik 2002, 611 ss.). Moreover, scholars have highlighted the exist-
ence of processes of ‘informal governance’ able to involve civil society actors in de-
cision-making, thus compensating the reduced electoral legitimacy of EU institutions 
(Kleine 2013, 3–7).  
This last point is central in the constitutional approach that usually interpre-
tates the direct involvement of private stakeholders as an ambiguous phenomenon, 
entailing threats and opportunities for democratic regimes. 
In the context of the EU, a part of the scientific literature has highlighted 
that the alleged inadequacy of the current institutional structures to manage economic 
development and new social demands (Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki 1975, 12 ss.) 
was an alibi for the introduction of a new political and regulatory rationality in deci-
sion-making at both national and supranational level. Rather than political accounta-
bility, market became the main instrument of interpretation and evaluation of existing 
rules (Weiss 2000, 796 ss). States are influenced by an ‘economic constituency’ (Fer-
rara 2006, 270–271), prevailing over the political one, who is able to pressure the 
public sector through the threat of withdrawing economic investments. Even beyond 
the mere laissez-faire (Nahamowitz 1992, 549), this pressure induced governments to 
shape their regulations according to the needs of the market, i.e. ‘to conceive the State 
as exponential of general and overall interests of capitalism’ (Ferrara 1979, 518) and 
to compete between each other in creating the most welcoming environment for pri-
vate investments.  
With the financial crisis in 2008, it was even clearer that market did not ad-
vocate for mere inaction and rather pressed for a complaisant action and regulation. 
For example, austerity required an analytic set of accounting rules that limited the 
power of States, especially in the social expenditure, and pushed to the privatisation 
of public debt. Along with a similar ratio, EU decision-making was burdened of very 
specific requirements and procedures (Garben 2018, 232) aiming at a ‘better regula-
tion’, exactly with the objective of avoiding that various stakeholders, and especially 
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small and medium-sized enterprises, might perceive the EU as too distant and at the 
same time too intrusive in imposing regulatory burdens5.  
This ideological and political turn is the framework under which private 
stakeholders have been involved as regulators and co-regulators through advanced 
legal mechanisms (Galgano 2009, 76 contra Cassese 2006). These decision-making 
procedures were able to relate with plural and everchanging forms of aggregation, 
articulating the involvement of different actors in different procedures with flexible 
modalities, able to change ad hoc and adjust to the circumstances. However, these 
mechanisms – being rooted in the market-oriented framework described above – do 
not tackle the basic democratic need of including everyone in decision-making and 
are rather directed to the involvement of the strongest and most influential private 
stakeholders6. 
This analysis highlights, once again, that participation is still characterised 
by structural inequalities that do not disappear automatically when representation is 
questioned in favour of a more direct involvement of stakeholders. Rather, in the 
absence of a specific and overall regulation – attentive towards factual inclusion – the 
opposite is true. 
 
2.2. Participation, Deliberation and Spontaneous Initiatives in the era of ‘distrust’ 
The above reasoning should make clear that equality, rather than represen-
tation itself, is the main challenge of European democracies. Then, the main question 
to address is how representation – which is still an essential pillar of democracy – can 
be complemented with different forms of participation that are able to reach a greater 
responsiveness of institutions and inclusion of marginalised categories in decision-
making. 
In this essay, the issue is addressed by exploring the innovative potential of 
participatory democracy in the framework of representative constitutional structures. 
 
5 European Commission, European governance - A White Paper, COM/2001/0428 final, OJ 287, 
12/10/2001. 
6 In the context of ‘better regulation’, see Alemanno 2015, 11-12; more generally, Bunea 2019, 127 
ss. 
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This expression is an umbrella concept (Sintomer 2009, 133–172), covering different 
forms of ‘interaction, within public procedures – above all administrative, but also regula-
tory – between society and institutions, which aims to achieve, through both collaboration 
and conflict, a unitary result, attributable to both of these subjects, on a case-by-case 
basis’ (Allegretti 2010, 7). It involves a broad range of practices and instruments, with 
very different genesis and purposes, with top-down or bottom-up nature, stemming 
from movements claiming self-determination against undesired interventions in their 
local area (Boullier 2001, 45 ss), the defence of local participatory traditions, the pres-
ence of political powers in need of a new electoral base, the reaction to corruption 
and clientelism... Finally, there may be a different degree of intensity of citizen inter-
vention, ranging from simple information, to consultation, to partnership, to actual 
involvement in decision-making processes (Arnstein 1969, 216–217). 
The purpose of these mechanisms is to enlarge the toolbox of political 
rights. In objective terms, participatory democracy also entails a shift of mindset: peo-
ple are not considered as a manipulable mass of citizen-users of a service, but as an 
active subject of public policies, bearing their own heritage of knowledge and theo-
retical-practical skills (Landemore 2011, 251). In a subjective sense, the informal na-
ture of these procedures allows the involvement of those that are not part of the 
constituency entitled to voting rights.  
This paradigm is intertwined, but not overlapping, with the one of deliber-
ative democracy. Deliberative processes are based upon the consensus of all inter-
ested parties in a rational exchange of arguments. They aim to involve everyone who 
bears a qualified interest in the matter (Elster 1998, 8) and to trigger a rational ex-
change of arguments among these actors that would ensure a better decision-making 
by transforming everyone’s opinions and interests themselves (Blondiaux 2000, 331; 
Bouvier 2007, 18) through argumentation. 
These forms were particularly developed at local level. Participation in local 
decision-making is empowering for citizens, because it is easier for them to have an 
impact on the public debate and, consequently, public policies. In parallel, cities and 
local areas are gaining an increasing centrality is the agenda and political scenario. 
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These ones are increasingly understood as the final point of impact of regional, State 
and even global policies (Harvey 2012), being the place where the enjoyment of rights 
is ultimately experimented and vindicated. Therefore, essential problems of contem-
porary democracies are more easily addressed by building up from local vindications 
and experiment with institutional changes at local level.  
However, many questions need to be answered about how to regulate the 
concrete participatory practices in order to attain these results. In that sense, this re-
search observes at least three kinds of challenges that communities need to address 
in the context of participatory processes. 
The first one is that public administrations are often organised through a rigid 
bureaucratic structure which is highly formal and often sectoral7. This circumstance 
can be a prejudice in the dialogue with grassroots movements, since the social needs 
are inherently cross-sectorial, and therefore demand transversal responses from the 
Administration (Torre 2021, 36–37). 
For example, the Italian model of ‘regulation on shared administration of 
commons’ is a virtuous example of a framework allowing a civic regeneration of ur-
ban spaces. Nevertheless, it constitutes a discrete corpus, even separated from the gen-
eral regulation on the management of public property; oppositely, to produce an ef-
fective change in decision-making, it would need to be part of a whole strategy in-
volving culture, urban planning and budget policies (Rete Nazionale dei Beni Comuni 
Emergenti e a Uso Civico 2019). In the Urban lab of Timişoara, Romania, the CCSC 
research showed that city funded cultural initiatives were hindered by legal uncertain-
ties over the property of the land where a festival was to be organised, due to the 
fragmentation and lack of transparency of the registers of public property8. In all 
these instances, not only citizens, but also open-minded civil servants – willing to 
support participatory processes – can find obstacles in the approval and 
 
7 Its limits are well analysed in O’Reilly (2010, 29 and following), even with some criticalities in the 
solutions proposed, that emphasised the need for a strong role of private parties, rather than a strong 
social intervention of the public sector.  
8 The data emerged from an interview with the coordinator of the Urban Lab Ambasada within the 
CCSC project.  
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implementation of participatory policies. For these reasons, local institutions them-
selves often provide for mechanisms of connection between different sectors in order 
to facilitate both participation and innovation9.  
The second type is given by political and cultural contingencies, that can un-
dermine the collaboration between citizens and local government or between the lat-
ter and the higher levels of government.  
Participation requires a strong political engagement from the administration, 
in order to invest appropriate resources for a more transparent decision-making and 
implementing the outcomes of participatory processes, especially when they raise top-
ics that were not originally in the administration’s agenda. In that sense, changes of 
political majority can negatively affect existing participatory experiments, as recently 
happened in Madrid with the participatory experience of Prado MediaLab, inter-
rupted after local elections and now experiencing an uncertain future10. The same case 
of Timişoara – during the implementation of the project for the European Capital of 
Culture 2021 – highlighted that a well working experimentation can also depend on 
the alliances with higher levels of government, for example, with regard to transports 
an infrastructure for mobility towards the city.   
Finally, the third and most structural challenge is linked to social barriers that 
impede participation, like the lack of time, energy or specialist knowledge11 (Iossifidis 
2020, 48). The deliberative paradigm assumes that everyone is able to master public 
speaking and the use of a specific language, while the reality shows that participation 
is also a matter of mediation between different languages and level of alphabetisation, 
even with the inclusion of non-verbal languages. Moreover, citizen initiatives struggle 
to keep the pace of administrations that decide and operate through remunerated 
staff and organised structures12.  
 
9 In that direction, see the experimentations of CoBoi, Region of Skane and City of Lund during the 
CCSC project (Torre 2020).  
10 https://wearethelab.org/. 
11 Within the CCSC project, this was well explained in: Jacobson & Ershammar 2020, 4. 
12 The data emerged from an interview with the coordinator of the Urban Lab Ambasada within the 
CCSC project. 
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In the most extreme cases, the lack of public investments for inclusion can 
transform participation in a delegation of public interest initiatives to private actors 
that are able to bear the burdens of philanthropy and, because of this economic 
power, also become privileged interlocutors for the administrations. For example, 
banking foundations who invest huge capitals in urban renewal and cultural initiatives 
– thus becoming the main drivers of these sectors – have a stronger negotiating power 
with regard to how urban policies are shaped13.  
To address these questions, the essay starts from the assumption that no 
encompassing solution can be proposed at this stage, where broad, inclusive and egal-
itarian participation is still far from being achieved. Any attempt could not but be 
utterly abstract at this stage. Rather, a realistic goal is to investigate how law can lay 
the groundwork for fostering emerging dimensions of participation and enable them 
to create the conditions for a broader transformation of current democracy.  
For this reason, the article will use the Italian case study – chosen for the 
reasons illustrated in the introduction – to illustrate how experiments of ‘participation 
through collaboration’ (Noveck 2010, 62 ss) and participation through self-organisa-
tion can allow individuals and organisations – especially at local level – to take part in 
the democratic life through the organisation of spontaneous initiatives of public in-
terest. 
 
3. Crisis of representation and Constitutional transformations. The Italian ex-
ample 
The trends described above will be analysed through the case study of Italian 
law. The transformation of the Italian Constitution is the legacy of a long institutional 
debate where the ‘distrust’, described above, has been used to weaken the legitimacy 
– and therefore the power – of the representative assembly. However, this path has 
not favoured participation, but rather the opposite, since the weakening of the legis-
lative power has played in the hands of the executive power.  
 
13 For a case study on Turin, see (De Tullio & Torre 2020). 
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In this context, bottom-up practices, also in the cultural sector, are observed 
as a possible engine of new participatory institutions stemming from grassroots self-
organisation. 
  
3.1. Crisis of representation and Perspective Constitutional Reforms 
The underlying assumption of the Italian Constitution, as conceived in 1948, 
is the centrality of the Parliament and the proportional electoral formula. Given the 
post-war fragmentation, a faithful representation of all parties was deemed vital to 
prevent, as much as possible, exclusions that could bring to further conflicts. How-
ever, over time, and across different political majorities, this system of mediation and 
representation and the parliamentary institution itself was delegitimised, being con-
sidered as the root of inefficient decision-making and waste of public money.  
The first tangible outcome of this process is the change of the electoral law.  
Since 1993, the proportional law was blamed for the inefficiency and insta-
bility of the Italian political system (Volpi 2015, 2–3) and substituted by formulas 
based on majority rules or majority bonuses. These laws encouraged political parties 
to coalesce before the elections; therefore, despite being in a parliamentary democ-
racy, they gave the impression that votes were given directly to a governmental ma-
jority (Furlani 1957, 875; Chessa 2004, 40). Moreover, the electoral law of 2005 arti-
ficially strengthened parliamentary majorities by means of a disproportional majority 
bonus which was indeed censored by the Italian constitutional court in 2014. 
Of course, the fragmentation of the political scenario was not resolved by 
the legal artifice of a new electoral law; moreover, parliamentary oppositions were 
marginalised in the democratic dynamics, due to the automatism of the majority bo-
nus. The reform produced fictional majorities and a fictio of direct ‘investiture’ (Car-
lassare 2006, 201; Bilancia 2009, 1816; Caretti 2008, 5–6) of the government14. In 
turn, this façade was used in governmental rhetoric to weaken minorities and justify 
the dogma of ‘governability’, i.e. the idea that the political direction rewarded by the 
 
14 See also Sartori 2002, 229, quoted in Barbera 2008, 879. 
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popular vote – embodied by the majority and the government – would not find insti-
tutional obstacles to its most complete implementation (Barbera & Fusaro 1997, 19; 
Bartole 2001, § 4; De Minico 2018, 51). 
This trend has pushed numerous attempts of unsuccessful constitutional re-
forms15 that demonstrated the need for ‘small steps’, thus posing an end to broad 
strategies proposing all-encompassing modifications. 
The present legislature is characterised by a different ideological approach 
to representation (Conti 2018, 5), but arguably also a continuity in the attempt to 
weaken the Parliament as a representative body. In particular, two reforms are em-
blematic in that sense.  
The first one is the modification of the discipline of parliamentary groups, 
that discourages Parliamentarians from leaving their own group (Contieri 2018, 11–
12), thus strengthening the grasp of party boards on them. This reform was imple-
mented in 2017 by the Senate of the XVII legislature; however, the XVIII legislature 
proposed to insert this rule in a proper constitutional modification (Fraccaro 2018).  
The second one is the reduction of Parlamentarians, that was proposed un-
der the XVII Legislature and then again in the XVIII16. The second attempt learned 
from previous experiences and proposed a policy of ‘little steps’. Rather than being 
embedded in an all-encompassing reform – as in 2016 – the provision was voted, and 
approved by referendum, as an individual modification.   
Such a vote, hitting the representative body par eccellence, was emblematic of 
a distrust towards political representation. This was also clear in the main political 
 
15 See the proposals elaborated by ‘Bozzi’ Commission (1983–85); the second Bicameral Commission, 
known as ‘De Mita-Iotti’ (1992–94); the third Bicameral Commission, so-called ‘D’Alema Commis-
sion’ (1997–1998); the constitutional law proposal of November 16th, 2005, No. 2544–D, G.U. 
18/11/2005, rejected by a constitutional referendum in 2006; the proposal of constitutional revision 
of the Commission for Institutional Reforms, established by the President of the Republic, Giorgio 
Napolitano (2013); the so-called ‘Renzi-Boschi’ reform (constitutional law - then rejected by constitu-
tional referendum - Disposizioni per il superamento del bicameralismo paritario, la riduzione del numero dei par-
lamentari, il contenimento dei costi di funzionamento delle istituzioni, la soppressione del CNEL e la revisione del titolo 
V della parte II della Costituzione, 16A03075, GU n.88 del 15-4-2016). See Pisaneschi 2015, 5–6; Villone 
2014, 69–291. 
16 The reform will be applied since the next election.  
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argument supporting the reform: economic efficiency, i.e. the reduction of public 
expenditures. Parliament was described as an élite which did not deserve its privileges. 
After all, the mere reduction of the number does not have a clear constitu-
tional ratio, other than the economic one. In terms of democratic legitimacy, it is an 
easy remark that the numeric reduction also reduces the pluralism within the Cham-
bers, especially that of minorities (Luciani 2018, 1). On the other hand, numbers do 
not per se improve the quality of the Parliament’s work if the functioning, decision-
making and political practices remain the same (Tripodina 2020, 12, contra Fraccaro 
2018); oppositely, a reduction of the organism can obviously impair its ability to sus-
tain the workload required in a contemporary democracy.   
In conclusion, the Italian case highlights that the ‘crisis of representation’ 
was an alibi – transversal across parties and legislatures – for the delegitimisation of 
the Parliament that was rather driven by concerns of economic efficiency and ac-
countability to markets. As a result, the weakening of the legislative power did not 
correspond to a more inclusive participation, but only to an advantage for the exec-
utive power and the boards of the majority parties. 
 
3.2. The Role of Local Experimentations in Renewing Democracy 
The above illustration underlines that a well-working participation does not 
depend on the weakening of representative mechanisms. Rather, it should be based 
on a reinforcement of representation through new forms of participation able to in-
clude everyone and particularly marginalised categories.  
 In the Italian context, local participation was deeply innovated by self-or-
ganised civil society that fostered the establishment of a new administrative paradigm, 
i.e. ‘horizontal subsidiarity’. In particular, this principle – recognised in the Italian 
Constitution since 2001 – refers to a duty of the public sector to support grassroots 
movements that respond collectively to social needs, through solidarity and mutual 
aid networks. These forms of action cannot, by themselves, influence the production 
of legally binding norms. Nevertheless, they are a form of political participation, since 
they collectively answer to aims of general interest (Albanese 2002, 66). Through their 
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spontaneous activities, they organise a public service by themselves and, at the same 
time, produce new forms of political organisation that propose their own policies and 
forms of intervention in public decision-making. Therefore, the recognition of these 
practices – contained in the reform of 2001 – is a permanent open door to bottom-
up institutional innovation. 
These participatory phenomena might have uncertain outcomes in official 
policies, when there is a poor dialogue between citizens and administration, since the 
formers are not formally part of any decision-making process; nevertheless, their ad-
vantage is that they can be put in practice ‘here and now’, and thus – in case of success 
– gain the legitimisation that is needed to vindicate recognition and support from the 
administration, in order to replicate and scale up the practices of reference.  
In the Italian case, this is very evident in the debate about urban commons, 
which highlighted how the bottom-up management of goods and services of public 
interest allows the experimentation of new legal arrangements for democratic partic-
ipation.  
The beginning of the ‘legal way’ to commons is usually identified in the 
‘Rodotà Commission’’s law proposal of 2007 and the immediately subsequent ‘Water 
Referendum’ of 2011 (Lucarelli 2011), accompanied by a popular law proposal – 
drafted from bottom-up by the Italian Forum of the Water Movements (Forum Italiano 
dei Movimenti per l’Acqua) – aiming to enact a participatory management of water as a 
common. Urban commoners, with a special role of cultural workers, took the legacy 
of this debate. Since 2011, communities have occupied theatres – firstly, Teatro Valle 
(Cirillo 2014) – and other abandoned and underused spaces, making them available 
to everyone as means of production and places for solidarity and mutual aid initia-
tives. These experiences have been called ‘emerging’ commons (Micciarelli 2014, 67), 
qualified as commons not because of their nature or function, but because of the 
direct role of the community in their management.  
With these conflictual actions, ‘emerging commons’ have joined the inter-
national movements occupying squares, streets, public and private spaces in order to 
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claim decision-making power and protest against precarity and right to the city 
(Kioupkiolis 2017, 51 ss). 
In the legal debate, the emerging commons even produced their own com-
munity-made legal forms, starting from the landmark case of l’Asilo (ex Asilo 
Filangieri) in Naples. This experience has begun in 2012 as an occupation of a city-
owned building, aimed at opening the latter to cultural workers and inhabitants in 
general. Its assemblies are accessible for everyone, without the need for prior regis-
tration, and decide by consensus, with a complete ban of any exclusive use of the 
space: the use is only possible under strict criteria of sharing or rotation. These rules 
were written in a Declaration of urban civic and collective use, then formally recog-
nised by the City of Naples through two Resolutions (Nos. 400/2012 and 893/2015) 
and extended to seven additional spaces (Resolution No. 446/2016). This legal ar-
rangement – engineered by the community itself – is called ‘urban civic and collective 
use’, and set a legal and political precedent in the management of public property, 
consisting in a public law pattern, strengthened by grassroots participation (Micciarelli 
2017, 159): the city recognises – and also materially supports – the self-government 
of an open and informal community, without selling or entrusting the good to any 
physical or legal person (De Tullio 2018). The material support provided by the city, 
by assuming the utilities and extraordinary maintenance, is exactly a tool for substan-
tial equality in participation. However, it is also a consequence of the acknowledge-
ment of what is usually not recognised: the ‘civic profitability’ of the experience, i.e. 
the social, political and cultural profitability, not directly related to an economic ad-
vantage.  
In that sense, this new legal arrangement was emblematic of how a commu-
nity can take the initiative through concrete actions and promote an alternative to a 
speculative government of the city and its spaces. What is more, the network of com-
mons was also able to propose its own participatory forms and vindicated the ap-
pointment of two consultative organisms: the Observatory on Commons17 and the 
 
17 https://www.comune.napoli.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/38205. 
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Council of Audit on Public Debt and Resources18 of the City of Naples. Both organ-
isms were composed through a public call, aimed at selecting those who are expert in 
social, political and economic activism, and represented a new kind of administrative 
board, in a dialectical position with respect to administration, with the function of 
analysis, proposal and control on the protection of the Urban Commons. 
Of course, this is only one case among the many urban commons existing 
in Italy. However, it is an example of many similar grassroots practices, where com-
munities engage themselves in a ‘creative use of law’.  
Namely, at the beginning of 2019, more than twenty among these organisa-
tions decided to build a ‘Network of Emerging and Civic Use Commons’19 (Rete Na-
zionale dei Beni Comuni Emergenti e a Uso Civico) to strengthen existing connection and 
obtain a stronger voice in the national political and legal debate. The Network, also 
in connection with other grassroots networks, has the aim to democratise knowledge 
and exchange interdisciplinary and practical tools – including legal and policy ones – 
to obtain recognition and support from local and national institutions, as well as 
transform institutions themselves. By now – through a series of five open assemblies 
gathered all across Italy – it is working on amendments to the existing proposals of 
law on commons and on coordinated proposals to amend the local Regulations on 
commons. This work is producing a whole political reasoning on commons – in con-
nection with alternative economies and ‘conflictual mutual aid’, ecology, depatriar-
chalisation, and digital activism – as well as new strategies to transform policy-making. 
In this context, these experiences of self-organisation innovate democratic 
participation at all levels: the local one, but potentially the national and the EU one, 
too. This multi-level grasp is a consequence of the fact that needs, as experienced by 
local communities, naturally cross the sectoral and jurisdictional barriers imposed by 
legal systems.  
For example, in the case of urban commons, local authorities hold a position 
of proximity to these experiments and have at least the responsibilities of urban 
 
18 https://www.comune.napoli.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/39860. 
19 www.retebenicomuni.it. 
Maria Francesca De Tullio, Cultural Policies as a Driver for a Participatory Transformation of Democracy in 
The European Union 
 
175 
 
administrators and owners of part of the real estate property. These competences 
allow them to give voice to civic experiences which – despite they are often small in 
size – are able to propose, starting from their own practices, new mutualistic and 
democratic methods.  
However, it is also necessary to recognise that local institutions cannot be 
substituted for the national ones, as they have neither the scale nor the resources20. 
Therefore – when the national government is inactive – the EU programmes repre-
sent one of the few sources of funding that local authorities can rely on to achieve 
cultural activities and initiatives for inclusion and participation. Hence, the substantial 
role of the supranational level goes beyond its formal scope, which is supposed to be 
only a support to the States’ policies (art. 5–6 TFEU).  
Clearly, this circumstance has an impact on the constitutional arrangement 
of local decision-making, with regard to both the role of representative institutions 
and the relationship with other territorial levels of government. The European cul-
tural programs – which formally do not provide for sanctions – in fact have signifi-
cant legal effects, exactly because of the budgetary constraints that limit the power of 
the local elected institutions. Where EU funding is among the very few means to 
implement cultural and participatory policies, the local entities are substantially forced 
to adapt themselves to the EU directions, if they want to fulfil their tasks with respect 
to the safeguard of culture and inclusion. Moreover, when a local institution decides 
to apply or to support a private party’s application, this decision is hardly controllable 
by the constituency. Indeed, there are at least two filters: the criteria set out in the 
Decision and the technical discretion of the applicant. 
Undoubtedly, this circumstance produces a transformation in the system of 
legal sources. This state of the art interrogates the jurist in depth: one can wonder 
whether it is preferable to pursue strict respect for local democratic forms – even at 
the cost of renouncing the satisfaction of social rights – or see the rights implemented, 
albeit based on the EU approach. 
 
20 In the Italian case, the limits imposed by budget rules were even deepened by the cut of transfers 
of resources from the central state to local level (Antonini 2015, 365–371). 
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4. Local Participation in the European Union’s Cultural Programs 
The case study demonstrated an emerging democratic role of cultural and 
creative spaces, which gives a true constitutional relevance to EU cultural programs 
aiming to support cultural and creative activities by financing both local institutions 
and cultural actors themselves. These programs have an unavoidable influence on 
decision-making; therefore, a reflection is needed on how this effect can be steered 
towards the objectives of broader inclusion and enrichment of – rather than compe-
tition with – local democratic processes. 
In light of this observation, the attention on local practices situates this anal-
ysis at the crossroads of both internal and EU ‘democratic deficit’.  
In that sense, the participatory logic of the EU, in its relationship with local 
communities, has to take into account the transformations of the traditional repre-
sentative mechanisms, as highlighted above. An enhancement of the role of Euro-
pean Parliament – which is the EU’s elected institution – would improve the connec-
tion between EU and local community. However, it would not be enough, given the 
crisis of representation itself. Even less could grassroots interests be represented by 
national governments, which can even be politically adversarial to local entities, as 
happens when local governments are composed by political majorities different from 
the national ones. 
Rather, there is the need for a direct support of experiences of spontaneous 
participation, as the ones described in para. 3.2. These policies would entail a clear 
and strict definition of participation itself in cultural programs in order to shift from 
a logic of ‘participation as consultation’ – adopted in the Structured Dialogues and 
other EU programs on participation – to the construction of spaces of dialogue and 
encounter between the community itself and institutions at all levels (Cremer 2021, 
124 ss.). Such a definition should be completed by a proactive effort of the EU to 
expand its outreach outside of the circles of the ‘usual suspects’, i.e. individuals and 
organisations that have already been in contact with EU programs and networks, and 
therefore are more likely to be included again. In the cultural sector as well as in other 
ones, an action of inclusion should target the excluded ones in first stance. Then, each 
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EU call should start from an active mapping of bottom–up practices that are poten-
tially transformative, that are in need of support, and that have not been involved in 
any program before. Many of these actors might not even know the existence of the 
opportunities brought by the EU, unless an action of communication and democra-
tisation is done by EU institutions themselves.  
In that sense, supporting bottom-up experiments – and accept to be surprised 
by them – could be an opportunity for EU to give away a part of its power in order 
to gain new legitimacy by adopting a listening approach and preserving spaces of 
bottom-up institutional transformation. This objective would be in line with the 
needs of cohesion and EU-local connection highlighted in the Council’s Work Plan 
for Culture itself. 
Hence, the working hypothesis of this research is that the EU should com-
pensate its democratic gap through a direct involvement of local communities as cre-
ators and protagonists of participatory processes. This is only possible if two steps 
are addressed. The first one is to tackle the precarity of the cultural sector as a factor 
of social and political exclusion. The second one is to rethink cultural programs in 
order to mainstream strict guidelines for participation in them and aim to listen, rec-
ognise and fund local civil society organisations engaged in bottom-up participation.  
 
4.1. Safeguarding Culture as a Social Right in the European Union 
The first step – EU support to culture and social rights – needs to be exam-
ined in the broader context of the protection of social rights in the EU law system. 
Indeed, culture is analysed here as both an enabler of social rights – then also a pre-
condition for the effective enjoyment of participatory rights – and a social right itself.  
Culture, in its anthropological sense, is a toolbox for sense-making, for eve-
ryone to give meaning to their life and their (social) environment (Gielen & Lijster 
2015). It shapes the government of territories because it defines visibility and con-
forms our physical, social and political living space. In that way, culture can multipli-
cate the forms of expression, change human relationships, improve health and create 
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inclusion. For these reasons, it was correctly defined as a labour of care towards so-
ciety (D’Andrea & Micciarelli 2020). 
In addition to that, culture is also a social right itself, exactly as participation: 
it is not sufficiently protected by the sole market and requires the public sector’s social 
intervention. In that sense, culture is also emblematic of the same inequalities that 
also affect participation: the sector experiences a huge precarity of labour and mar-
ginalisation from market-oriented policies. In light of this situation, the ‘non-interfer-
ence’ of public authorities is not enough to safeguard the free cultural expression 
because it only protects the cultural expressions that can survive autonomously. In-
stead, it fails to empower precarious, experimental or marginalised manifestations, 
that do not find enough resources in the market.  
In other words, a ‘cultural politics’ is needed to avoid that the market law 
becomes the sole discipline of the sector.  
Therefore, there is a double thread linking culture, inclusion, and participa-
tion, and – given this connection – it is no coincidence that culture was the base for 
the creation of innovative responses to the ‘crisis of representation’. 
For these reasons, culture is recognised in the EU both as a value itself21 
and a multiplier of other values22, such as, on the one hand, economic development 
and, on the other hand, participation and social inclusion23.  
However, the sector is under the States’ exclusive competence: the EU can-
not use norms of harmonisation – unless justified by other legal bases, as the Single 
 
21 Council conclusions on the Work Plan for Culture 2019-2022, 2018/C 460/10, 21/12/2018.  
22 Cfr. Council conclusions on cultural and creative crossovers to stimulate innovation, economic sus-
tainability and social inclusion, 2015/C 172/04, point 4. Concerning inclusion, see also: European 
Parliament Resolution of 12 May 2011 on Unlocking the Potential of Cultural and Creative Industries 
(2010/2156(INI), 2010/2156(INI), 2012/C 377 E/19. 
23 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘A New 
European Agenda for Culture’, {SWD(2018) 167 final}, 22/5/2018, pp. 2-4. On the two profiles, see 
respectively the OMC reports: The Role of Public Policies in Developing Entrepreneurial and Inno-
vation Potential of the Cultural and Creative Sectors, Report of the OMC Working Group of Member 
States’ Experts, 2018, pp. 96 ss.; Participatory Governance of Cultural Heritage, Report of the OMC 
Working Group of Member States’ Experts, 2018, 57. The recommendation was preceded by the 
Conclusioni del Consiglio sulla governance partecipativa del patrimonio culturale, 2014/C 463/01, 
23/12/2014. 
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Market – but only acts that encourage cooperation and support Member States’ ac-
tions (Art. 6 TFUE).  
The relatively small amount of resources invested in culture is also a key 
indicator, given the social nature of cultural rights. In 2018, the European Parlia-
ment’s Commission on culture warned about the scarcity of resources allocated to 
culture, asking for them to be even doubled24. The European Commission itself rec-
ognised that culture generated 5,3% of GDP, and that – due to the scarcity of funds 
– ‘a large number of good applications are rejected’25 in cultural programs.  
These data affect not only the number of actors that can enjoy a protection 
from the EU, but also the more general direction of cultural policies. Indeed, the 
scarcity of funds generates programmes characterised by a highly competitive nature, 
which undermines exchange and confrontation and, above all, increases access barri-
ers, which can only be overcome by those who have specialist expertise in drafting 
applications. Moreover, the absence of a structural investment makes it unrealistic to 
support fragile, precarious and excluded realities, which need more resources and ex-
poses the financer to greater risks. It is no coincidence that funding programmes 
impose co-financing or require candidates to provide credit guarantees and/or 
demonstration of economic sustainability (Acosta Alvarado 2020, 8–9). Therefore, 
they benefit especially actors who are already established in the market or in other 
programmes.  
As an alternative, the EU tends to finance projects that are supported by the 
voluntary action of citizens and inhabitants. Therefore, the value generated by the 
project is increased by the unpaid labour of active communities, that acts as a multi-
plier of efforts and resources and enables to fulfil meaningful actions without remu-
nerating all the work that is provided in the process. For example, people can be 
 
24 European Parliament – Committee for Culture and Education, Opinion to the Interim Report on 
the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 – Parliament’s position with a view to an agreement, 
PE 626.946v02-00 A8-0358/2018, COM(2018)0322 – C8‑0000/2018 – 2018/0166R(APP), 
7/11/2018. Cfr. Ciancio 2018, 34. 
25 Mid-term evaluation of the Creative Europe programme (2014-2020), Report from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2018) 248 final, 30/4/2018, in https://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0248&from=EN, p. 5.  
Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 7(1) 2021:157-197, DOI: 10.1285/i20398573v7n1p157 
180 
 
invited to produce ideas in workshops, hackathons, contest of ideas, participatory 
artworks and many other occasions where they give their time and competences for 
the sake of general interest or other individual incentives.  
In sum, the resources mostly allow one-off interventions which rely on the 
prior existence of mechanisms that multiply the value invested: those of the market 
and/or those of voluntary participation26. 
In that sense, the safeguard of culture and participation in local communities 
attains a broader and systemic discussion in the EU law: the protection of social 
rights. The first step for the EU should be to go towards a shift of mindset able to 
put social rights, and their enforcement, on the top of the agenda.  
Currently the approach of EU Treaties appears to be rather the opposite.  
In principle, the EU seems to promote individual and social cohesion as 
fundamental values (Art. 3 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - 
TFUE) and points towards the improvement of working and living conditions. How-
ever, these values are not intended as a project of ‘substantial equality’ and are rather 
a counterbalance to the most extreme effects of the Single Market. Indeed, social 
policies have always been a Member States’ exclusive competence (art. 5 TFEU): the 
EU cannot operate through a formal harmonisation of national laws, but only with 
acts of encouragement to cooperation and support to Member States’ actions. 
This choice became part of a strategy where ‘soft law’ is presented as a 
means for ‘better regulation’ (Garben 2018), along with the subsidiarity and propor-
tionality principles (Art. 5 Treaty on European Union–TEU). The objective of ‘better 
regulation’ was to introduce a form of legal intervention and, at the same time, avoid 
being considered too intrusive by the civil society, especially the small and medium 
enterprises which could distrust the EU rule-maker because of its distance from the 
local contexts. 
 
26 The OMCs on culture have underlined the relationship with both needs, even if there is the risk 
that culture is conceived as instrumental to the other values (Psychogiopoulou 2018, 271).  
Maria Francesca De Tullio, Cultural Policies as a Driver for a Participatory Transformation of Democracy in 
The European Union 
 
181 
 
The non bindingness of these policies has been supported through different 
arguments, based on the claim that a full and coercive safeguard would have been 
impossible, or at least would have required longer negotiations (O’Hagan 2004, 384). 
Flexibility has been deemed necessary in multilevel systems (Laffan, O’Donnell & 
Smith 2000, 201); moreover, along with an approach based on ‘little steps’, some 
authors have underlined that even a ‘soft’ provision can be the basis for further de-
velopments and agreements (Cini 2001, 195; Simmons 2013, 281) or a ‘manifesto’ 
that can legitimate a given policy approach (Luther 2018, 54–56).  
However, many scholars claim, on the contrary, that soft law is structurally 
insufficient to ensure social rights, which require – by definition – institutional inter-
vention, directly tackling the factors of inequality (Seeleib-Keiser 2019). Rather, the 
soft law approach has been considered as an expression of ‘neo-volontarism’ (Streeck 
1995), where States keep the power of deciding whether to cooperate and how 
(Rogowski 2019, 289). 
The debate was not pacified by the approval of the European Pillar of Social 
Rights (EPSR)27, despite the statements of principles contained in the declarations 
(Juncker 2019). Different authors highlight that the Strategy provides a limited ad-
vancement in terms of safeguard of human rights (Augenstein 2018, 261; Bonciu 
2018, 65–66; Giubboni 2018, 562–563; Grohs 2019, 28), or even a retreat, in com-
parison to the fact that social rights had been already introduced – among other rights 
– in the so-called ‘Nice Charter’, namely in Title IV and Artt. 31 and 34 (Cozzi 2018, 
518)28.  
This context radically hinders any democratic effort, since it shows a renun-
ciation to eliminate the roots of exclusion.  
This problem cannot be entrusted to cultural programs or participatory 
tools and methodologies. Rather, it needs to be tackled through structural measures, 
 
27 European Commission Recommendation of 26.4.2017 on the European Pillar of Social Rights, 
C(2017) 2600 final; Council of the European Union, Proposal for an Interinstitutional Proclamation 
on the European Pillar of Social Rights, 13129/17, 20/10/2017. The Interinstitutional Proclamation, 
in particular, expressly excludes any expansion of EU’s power in social policies (Ibid., consid. 18). 
28 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01, 18/12/2000. 
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like the identification – and financial support – of minimal standards of protection of 
social rights at EU level (Vesan & Corti 2018, 130; Seeleib-Kaiser 2019, 233–234), 
even with a shared taxation specifically targeted at the equalisation among social cat-
egories and territorial communities (Ferrera 2018, 581). 
 
4.2. Rethinking Cultural programs for Local Participation 
The second step – mainstreaming citizens’ involvement in funding programs 
– requires funding and recognition as forms of support and legitimisation of social 
actors, as well as fostering networks of mutual help and learning among the cities and 
their communities. This objective entails the need to create a broad framework ena-
bling and supporting experimentations as well as recognising them as potential ben-
eficiary of EU cultural programs.  
In that sense five recommendations are proposed in this paper.  
The first recommendation is to change the requirements of funding programs 
– and namely of Creative Europe, the biggest EU cultural program – to facilitate the 
access of small and grassroots organisations. A major barrier, in that sense, is the 
requirement of legal personality provided to access grant applications, since many 
social initiatives stem from informal communities in first place. An abolition of this 
requirement would allow cultural programs to fund informal communities directly; in 
the meantime, the EU could use mechanisms of cascade funding to support them 
through an intermediary subject. A second major barrier is represented by financial 
stability requirements, that actually exclude the most precarious categories, since they 
require to grant a co–funding or to obtain a guarantee. The basic values of equality 
and inclusion would impose an abandonment – and even a reversion – of such rules. 
EU is not a private investor, but an institutional funder, committed to values of co-
hesion and social inclusion; therefore, it should not seek a return of investment, but 
rather privilege individuals and organisations that experience financial instability, 
along with criteria of ‘positive discrimination’.  
The second recommendation is to introduce simplified and flexible account-
ing rules. The present accounting requirements drain resources from the already 
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limited cultural budget, and especially from the cultural work itself (Gielen 2020, 29), 
and are unaffordable for smaller cultural actors. Moreover, they do not acknowledge 
that projects – as highlighted in the Italian case study – need to risk and experiment 
in order to produce innovation in culture and participation. In that sense, transpar-
ency and openness of implementing processes towards local community should be 
considered as an essential element for the accountability in the use of public EU 
funds. Complex reporting rules rather privilege specific expertise on accounting, 
while a comprehensive report is not per se a guarantee of the social value of the project.  
The third recommendation is to develop guidelines for participation as man-
datory requirements for local institutions that want to apply for and participate in 
EU-funded programmes. With regard to these guidelines, the EU should also act as 
an impartial overseeing authority, similar to those provided in the paradigmatic model 
of the French ‘débats publics’ (Rui 2007, 104 ss.). These guidelines should set mini-
mum qualitative thresholds for collaborative agenda-setting, transparency, data shar-
ing, inclusion, non-discrimination and the appropriate allocation of time and re-
sources. Local institutions should also be required to provide specific motivations 
when they do not implement the outcomes of a participatory process. These measures 
would be a necessary counterbalance of the requirements of stability and efficiency 
imposed in the same programs to local institutions: a way to compensate the heter-
onomy of EU standards – imposed in cultural programs, as described above – with 
an empowerment of local communities in the agenda-setting as well as the delibera-
tion and implementation of the project proposal.  
The fourth recommendation is to acknowledge that ‘participatory processes 
are labour-intensive, and as such necessitate some kind of compensation’ (Iossifidis 
2020, 52), or indemnisation. The ratio of such a remuneration would be the substantial 
equality, i.e. the need to bridge the gap between grassroots initiatives and strong 
vested interests, who have specific resources for lobbying.  
Such compensation ‘could be in the form of in-kind support in training and 
consulting’ (Ibid.), or happen through the allocation of public asset, as in the case of 
the ‘urban collective and civic uses’, described above (Cozzolino & Parenti 2020, 18). 
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Therefore, the EU could provide the local institutions and communities with a legal 
framework and an appropriate training allowing to entrust a part of the municipal/re-
gional real estate property to self-organised and self–governed collectives of inhabit-
ants and/or cultural and creative workers. Indeed, as demonstrated by the Italian 
‘emerging commons’, spaces are resources that can be used by communities and 
workers to develop policies and networks of mutual aid, with a strong transformative 
potential.   
Of course, this could not be a way to substitute the social intervention needed 
to fund cultural labour, nor would it bridge the social gap that hinders participation, 
in the sense highlighted above. Nevertheless, it would be an essential support to com-
mons and other grassroots movements, since it is one of the ways through which 
institutions can support social needs without interfering with their self–determina-
tion. 
Finally, the practical and political expertise that citizens bring in participatory 
processes should be valorised in addition to the academic one, and remunerated 
where possible, because of its contribution to better policy-making.  
Fifth and last one, the EU can support local institutions by proposing a range 
of legal tools that they can use to allocate public and private spaces to cultural partic-
ipatory initiatives. Such a measure would allow civil servants to overcome different 
obstacles mainly related to budgetary rules that encourage the privatisation of public 
property as a means of generating revenue for local institutions. 
In that sense, the EU can draw from the experiments of many local institu-
tions and communities that have developed different tools. Sometimes this involves 
ad hoc tools provided in local regulations, such as the Italian ‘pacts of collaboration’ 
for the shared care, regeneration and administration of commons or the assignment 
for community management made with Can Batlló in Barcelona29 based on its civic 
profitability and valorising the social return on investment. In other instances, these 
legal instruments are the result of the creative use of legal tools provided by private 
law, all of which are especially useful when a good is privately owned. For example, 
 
29 See https://www.facebook.com/canbatllo/. 
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instruments such as Heritable Building Rights or Community Land Trusts have been 
used to impede the sale of the good on the speculative real estate market and to im-
pose affordable house rents. 
In the long term, the most complex question concerns the procedures for 
grant-making. Indeed, the logic of public granting requires transparency and impar-
tiality of selections. Usually, these criteria are pursued through an evaluation based 
on parameters defined a priori by the EU. However, community-led experiments are 
by definition not identifiable ex ante and from top-down: the criteria of their recogni-
tion can only come by the community itself.  
This apparent paradox can only be addressed if the process of recognition 
and evaluation of grassroots practices is entrusted to grassroots practices themselves. 
In that sense, an interesting example can be found in the agroecological field, which 
has developed Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGS), for example for organic prod-
ucts (FAO 2018). These forms of certification are based upon mechanisms of trust 
among networks of producers and consumers, which are built first of all as a way to 
exchange knowledge and build solid relationships (Cuéllar Padilla 2010, 3–4). In these 
systems, common standards are defined within each network – through a technical 
evaluation and a negotiation of values – and enforced through regular visits in each 
other’s fields, that give place to a certification. The aim of the certification is to favour 
the encounter and mutual learning, rather than merely controlling: sometimes even 
the sanctions are also meant as a way to provide solidarity aid to farmers that have 
experienced involuntary violations (Ibid., 11). In that way, these systems provide a 
federated certification based on trust that some States have recognised as equivalent 
– in terms of impartiality and reliability – to the third-party certifications which are 
based, instead, on the identification of a priori requirements and the validation of an 
independent expert.  
The lesson learnt from these cases is that being external to an experiment 
does not mean necessarily to be an expert of the field; rather, the opposite is true, 
since only participants themselves can assess how helpful an experience is in terms 
of participation. In these cases, with the same logics of open–source software, the 
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quality is not guaranteed by secrecy and impartiality, but by the social control enacted 
by networks of producers and users. It is time, then, that new criteria – similar to 
these ones – are recognised by EU programs and taken as a point of reference for 
funding who are meant to support participation.  
Of course, transporting the institution of PGS to the cultural field is a ques-
tion, more than an answer, since it needs to address different issues, such as: how the 
systems can work on transnational scale, where there is no proximity among the ac-
tors involved (Cavallet, Canavari & Neto 2018, 10); how to ensure the openness of 
the networks, which is the real guarantee of the system; how to identify the relevant 
networks.  
Moreover, in the present scenario, fragmented by precariousness and compe-
tition, specific funding would be needed for pilot programs aiming to foster networks 
of trust and mutual aid that can enact forms of PGS. In that sense, even smaller grants 
– reaching a wider number of actors – would grant resources that organisations can 
invest in creating networks and agreeing on common standards. The EU could em-
ploy its own human resources to facilitate and support these processes, in order to 
lighten the material burdens of networking and create the preconditions for a mutual 
connection among grassroots cultural actors.   
 
5. Conclusions 
The above reflections show that culture and grassroots participation are now 
ineluctable fields of interest for constitutional law, being pivotal in the dynamics of 
representation. Namely, spontaneous collective engagement in activities of general 
interests – even if in small-scale experiments – can represent a deep and widespread 
transformative force in local communities. Self-organisation, especially in the cultural 
sector, has demonstrated to be able to create new legal tools and new institutions by 
building up from participatory artistic, social and political practices. Culture is the 
base of these initiatives, keeping open spaces of possibility and making new social 
and political imaginaries possible.  
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In particular, the work focused on the role of EU cultural policies which are 
central, not mainly because of their legal instrumentation, but especially due to eco-
nomic incentives that EU programs entail for local institutions and grassroots organ-
isations. Given this context, recognising the autonomy and reflexivity of grassroots 
experiments can be a way to integrate local representation – without interfering with 
it – by actively supporting actors that undertake a daily work for the fulfilment of 
social rights and institutional innovation through cultural activities. Such a path in-
volves a rethinking of the EU system of social protection, as a necessary precondition 
for an inclusive democracy and therefore a necessary answer to the ‘democratic defi-
cit’ of the EU.  
Conclusively, the paper addresses the current ‘crisis of representation’ 
through a community-led approach to participation. In that sense, it understands the 
empowerment of social initiatives as a ‘needs-based approach’ to a multilevel partici-
pation, able to tackle EU’s democratic deficit as well as the subjection of national 
constitutions to contrasting pressures of the market and the citizens’ ‘distrust’.   
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